We optimize secret key rates (SKRs) of weak coherent pulse (WCP)-based quantum key distribution (QKD) over time-varying free-space optical channels affected by atmospheric turbulence. The random irradiance fluctuation due to scintillation degrades the SKR performance of WCP-based QKD, and to improve the SKR performance, we propose an adaptive scheme in which transmit power is changed in accordance with the channel state information. We first optimize BB84 and decoy statebased QKD protocols for different channel transmittances. We then present our adaptation method, to overcome scintillation effects, of changing the source intensity based on channel state predictions from a linear autoregressive model while ensuring the security against the eavesdropper. By simulation, we demonstrate that by making the source adaptive to the time-varying channel conditions, SKRs of WCP-based QKD can be improved up to over 20%.
Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) has remained a promising secure communication technology since the first complete protocol was presented by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 , which is now well-known as the BB84 protocol [1] . QKD allows two authentic distant parties, i.e., the sender-Alice and the receiver-Bob, to share a common sequence known as the secret key, which is unknown to a third party, i.e., the eavesdropper-Eve. The unconditional security of QKD is ensured by the quantum laws of physics. To fill the gap between theory and practice, many additional achievements have been required on both theoretical and experimental side. Most importantly, the unconditional security of BB84 QKD protocol has been proved asymptotically with realistic limitations such as lack of single-photon sources [2] - [5] and under finite key resources [6] , [7] . A composable "-security definition was given in [7] so that QKD is proved to be compatible with other cryptography protocols in a cryptosystem theory. The idea of decoy state-based QKD protocols has been proposed and proved to be a good solution for substantially improving the performance of QKD based on weak coherent pulses (WCPs) to overcome the inherent shortage of using commercial available laser sources [8] - [10] . The security proof based on the uncertainty relation for smooth entropies [7] , [11] has been applied in [12] and [13] to decoy state-based protocols. On the experimental side, QKD demonstration over long distances has been achieved for both optical fiber and free-space optical (FSO) links. Fiberoptics based QKD links and networks have been built and tested all over the world [14] - [17] , and the record transmission distance of 307 km has been reported in [18] . In the free spaceoptical QKD arena, from the first experimental demonstration of QKD over a 32 cm path in 1992 [19] to recent implementation over a free space optical link of 144 km in 2007 [20] , [21] , the tremendous improvement in both the transmission distance and secure key rates performance has been achieved.
The FSO communication channel offers a flexible physical layer to implement QKD. On the other hand, the free space channel also brings atmospheric degradations into picture, in particular the scintillation effect. The FSO channel is typically characterized as a time-varying and/or a fading channel. The randomly irradiance fluctuation at the receiver side would dramatically reduce the secret key rate (SKR) when the channel is in a deep fade since the received power is very low. In this paper, we propose an adaptation method to compensate for the effects of such a time-varying FSO channel, in the presence of strong atmospheric turbulence, by predicting the channel state information (CSI) and then adapting source intensity to the channel conditions, while ensuring the security against Eve. This method is based on autoregressive (AR) linear predictor model. To study its efficiency, we develop a time-varying block fading model of atmospheric turbulence. The optimization of SKR performance is performed for two WCP-based QKD protocols: BB84 and decoy state-based protocols. We demonstrate by simulations that significant SKR performance improvement can be achieved employing the proposed AR predictive method in the presence of strong atmospheric turbulence effects.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we first optimize the BB84 QKD protocol in the absence of turbulence in order to find the optimal system parameter values. In Section 3, we model the scintillation effects under strong turbulence as a time-varying block fading channel. In Section 4, we present the AR adaptation method and study SKR performance improvements of WCS-based BB84 by employing the developed time-varying FSO channel model. In Section 5, we conduct decoy state-based protocol optimization and study SKR performance improvements by AR adaptation method. Some important concluding remarks are provided in Section 6.
BB84 Protocol Optimization in the Absence of Atmospheric Turbulence
For practical implementation of QKD, one of the most essential problems is to prove its security for finite key resources. The SKR depends on the total number of pulses N exchanged between Alice and Bob due to the uncertainty during parameter estimation process. In [7] , a tight lower bound of the minimum number of pulses required to achieve a certain level of security ("-security) is derived for the BB84 protocol, which shows that a positive key rate can be obtained for N > 10 3 . Another practical issue for implementing QKD is the lack of real single-photon sources as required in the original BB84 protocol. Weak coherent sources are commonly used in many QKD systems as replacements for prefect single-photon sources. The photon number of each signal pulse, for such a source, follows a Poisson distribution with a source parameter , which represents the expected average photon number. The probability of signal pulses containing n photons is given by p n ¼ expðÀÞ Á n =n!, and the total probability that the pulses contain multi-photons is p multi ¼ P n!2 p n . In such cases, occasional multi-photon emission from the source gives an opportunity to the eavesdropper (Eve), and this allows her to get information without being detected through so-called photon number splitting (PNS) attacks [22] . In order to ensure the security, source intensity needs to be additionally attenuated as the channel transmittance decreases, which greatly limits the expected SKR and maximum transmission distance. For a given channel loss, SKR strongly depends on the source intensity. Combining the calculation in [7] , in which the expected secret key rate per detected signal is given, with the finite detection efficiencies and considering PNS attacks, the final SKR per time slot is given by
where % ð1=N Á lnð1=" sec ÞÞ 1=2 is the term accounting for statistical fluctuation due to finite size resources effect. The expected detection probability is p exp ¼ 1 À expðÀt Bob Á T Þ in which t Bob is the overall detection efficiency of Bob's side, and it is calculated as the product of R X aperture transmittance RX , Bob's optics transmittance Bob , detector transmittance det , and the quantum efficiency of detector Qeff 
ÀL=10 is the channel transmittance in which is the attenuation coefficient measured in dB/km, and L is the transmission distance in km. With hðx Þ ¼ Àx log 2 ðx Þ À ð1 À x Þlog 2 ð1 À x Þ, we denoted the binary Shannon entropy function. Further, e ¼ e IR þ 1=2p b represents the quantum bit error rate (QBER), where e IR is the probability of having an error per time slot due to Eve's intercept and resend attack and p b denotes the background noise error probability including the detector dark count rate. e IR is determined by the probability p IR that Eve executes her intercept-resend attack on single photon pulses which we take p IR ¼ 0:1 yielding e mis ¼ 1=4p IR Á p 1 Á p exp . The error correction leakage term leak EC is given by leak EC % f EC Á hðeÞ with f EC being the error correction efficiency which is bounded as f EC ðeÞ ! 1. The security parameters " cor and " sec are defined as "correctness" and "secrecy" to evaluate how "secure" is the protocol [7] . The total security of the protocol is given by " ¼ " sec þ " cor . The only remaining term in (1) is p AE , the detection probability at Eve's detectors, which is related to the Alice's optics transmittance Alice and Eve's location. The position of Eve will affect the optimal choice of source intensity. Intuitively, the more Eve can access the more we need to attenuate the source. We calculate the optimal source intensity for different channel losses and different Eve's positions with results summarized in Fig. 1 , and parameters used in our simulation are listed in Table 1 . As shown in the figure, both the SKR and optimal parameter decrease as the channel loss increase. As the distance between Alice and Eve, denoted as d AE , decreases, which means Eve is closer to Alice and that the ratio between d AE and the total distance d AB decreases from 1 (Eve at Bob's side) to 0 (Eve at Alice's side), the optimal source intensity decreases, hence, the SKR.
Time-Varying FSO Channel Model in the Presence of Atmospheric Turbulence
The light beam propagating through a time-varying FSO channel experiences both phase and intensity perturbations due to the random distribution of the refractive index, which is known as turbulence [23] , [24] . The intensity or irradiance fluctuation is commonly referred to as scintillation. Scintillation effect in FSO channels has been extensively studied to derive a probability density function (PDF) of the random fluctuation of irradiance. The Gamma-Gamma ðÀ À ÀÞ distribution serves as a good model for the optical scintillation for wide range of turbulence strengths ranging from weak turbulence, when it resembles the log-normal distribution, through medium-to-strong turbulence resembles the Rayleigh distribution, to strong-to-saturation turbulence regime when it resembles the exponentially decreasing distribution, which is given as [23] , [24] pðIÞ ¼ 2ðÞ
where I is the normalized received power at the receiver, ÀðÁÞ is the gamma function, and K p ðÁÞ is a modified Bessel function of the second kind. The parameters and represent the effective number of large-scale cells and small-scale cells in the scattering process, respectively, and are defined as functions of Rytov variance R 2 which is typically used as a metric for turbulence strength. Weak turbulence is associated with R 2 G 1, and moderate fluctuation conditions are characterized by R 2 $ 1. Strong fluctuations are associated with R 2 > 1, and the so-called saturation regime is defined by the condition R 2 ! 1.In the presence of non-zero inner scale l 0 , the model is a À À À distribution with its parameters given by
where 2 lnX is given by 
For the frequency characterization of optical scintillation, the intensity fluctuation is highly correlated over the atmospheric coherence time. The coherence time c is defined as the minimum time duration over which two successive received power samples are uncorrelated. Studies have been carried out to model the power spectral density (PSD) of optical scintillation for both horizontal and vertical paths [25] , [26] . General formulas are given in [23] for the temporal frequency spectra of optical scintillation for both plane waves and Gaussian beam waves. However, the PSD varies from place to place for different environments, and it is affected by weather conditions.
A simple Butterworth-type spectral model for terrestrial FSO links, which is determined by two parameters, the cut-off frequency, and the spectral slope, is proposed in [25] . The power transfer function of a Butterworth filter is given as
where f c is the cut-off frequency, and k is the slope order. This power transfer function fits well to the shape of the optical scintillation's PSD derived from experimental data for a horizontal link in an urban terrestrial environment [25] . We use this Butterworth model with a cut-off frequency of f c ¼ 12 Hz and order k ¼ 1 in our channel model to achieve a channel coherence time c $ 10 ms. To model the optical scintillation under strong turbulence condition, we firstly generate a sequence of uncorrelated normal distributed random samples, and then filter the sequence by the Butterworth filter. We then map each sample from the normal distribution to a Gamma-Gamma distribution given in (2) with the Rytov variance 2 R ¼ 10 using memoryless non-linear transform (MNLT) [27] , which maps data from the normal distribution to Gamma-Gamma distribution by equating their cumulative density functions (CDFs), and correlation in the sequence is preserved. The PSD and PDF of the time-varying FSO channel model are given in Fig. 2(a) and (b) . The coherence time is approximately 10 ms as we expected. We further reduce the scintillation model to a block fading model by assuming that channel is constant within the coherence time. In Fig. 2(b) , it shows that the PDF of the block fading model fits very well with the theoretical distribution. We also assume that fluctuations in the received intensity are entirely due to fluctuations in the channel transmittance so that the transmission efficiency of the channel, e.g., the channel transmittance T , is proportional to the received irradiance, which can be calculated as the product of average transmittance and normalized received power given by the block fading model.
Channel State Prediction
The SKR performance of FSO based QKD system can be significantly affected by the scintillation effect. Generally, a fixed source intensity was often assumed, which is typically based on an average channel condition, while the time-varying nature of the FSO channel is usually neglected. Therefore, in the presence of turbulence, the fixed transmit power is often mismatched with respect to real-time channel transmittance, hence leading to a reduced security. In an FSO based QKD, the scintillation effect shows opposite trend (in terms of SKR) when compared to the finite key effect. For a fixed sampling rate, the more samples we collect in order to have better estimation of parameters, the more fluctuations we will see in the SKRs. Due to the scintillation effect, the SKRs will be fluctuating along with the channel states, and a lower bound needs to be recalculated to ensure the security of the QKD.
To deal with time-varying FSO channel conditions, we propose an adaptation method in which we monitor the FSO channel with an auxiliary classical signal, then predict channel states based on the previous and current channel states, and change the source intensity according to the channel predictions to get improved the SKRs. In a real world system, there might be some delay between measurement of the channel state and implementation of the adjustment to the source parameters, which could arise from the physical transmission latency through the path or due to some signal processing procedures in the system. In such case, predicting the channel states in a real-time is necessary. In our adaptation method, an autoregressive (AR) predictor is used on Alice side to predict channel state information, and the accuracy of the predictions determines how much improvement we can achieve with this adaptation scheme. An AR model can also be treated as an infinite impulse response (IIR) filter and the problem to solve is finding the filter coefficients leading to minimum mean square error. By definition, an autoregressive model is given as
where a i are the autoregressive coefficients ði ¼ 1; . . . ; Þ, y t is the successive time series (i.e., channel states of time-varying channel), is the order of the model, and " t is the residual error, which is assumed to be a zero-mean white noise process. By using the AR model above, each channel state y t can be predicted from previous states as follows:
whereŷ t denotes an estimate of real value y t . The difference between the real measured value and the predicted value is defined as the prediction error
As the order of the AR model increases, the performance of predictor usually improves. Root mean square (RMS) error between the predicted series and the actual values is commonly calculated to evaluate the accuracy of the predictor. We model an ARðÞ predictor based on the block fading model built in Section 3 and perform either single-step prediction or multi-step prediction with the order up to 20. As shown in Fig. 3 , the RMS error drops very fast at order ¼ 3 and then decreases slowly as the filter order increases. Also the prediction length K affects the prediction accuracy, which is also denoted as "K -steps-ahead" prediction in the figure. The simulation results for prediction length up to 10 steps are shown in Fig. 4 . Indeed, the RMS error increases with the prediction length.
We adapt source intensity based on the knowledge of the channel by predicting channel states. An example of the improvement for our adaptation method is illustrated in Fig. 5 . In this example, a standard BB84 protocol based on weak coherent source is considered with Eve located at Alice's side ðd AE =d AB ¼ 0Þ. The blue curve in the middle shows the SKR under an average channel transmittance T ¼ abs Á scatt , in which the absorption abs and scattering scatt transmittances are given in Table 2 . For this mean value, the optimal source intensity ¼ 0:195 is chosen to achieve maximum SKR. When the channel is in a deep fade, for instance the yellow curve at bottom, we need to turn down the source power to ensure the security. The optimal intensity is changed to a new value ¼ 0:135. It can be easily seen from the figure that the SKR improves from the black dash line to the gray dash line by operating with the new optimal value. Similar to the worse case, when the channel condition becomes better, like the red curve shown at top, adapting the source intensity to the new higher optimal value ¼ 0:25 also increases SKR. In summary, the adaptation method allows the source to operate at the optimal (or suboptimal when predictions are not accurate) intensity.
By using the adaptation method, we simulate BB84 based QKD with weak coherent source under strong turbulence by using the block fading model for the time-varying FSO channel, as described in Section 3 [see Fig. 2(b) ]. Here, we use the same parameters listed in Tables 1 and  2 . A simple first order AR(1) model, which is trained by first 1000 samples in the channel model, is used to predict the channel states one coherence time, c , and five coherence times ahead. SKR is calculated using (1) for each coherence time and then averaged over total transmitted signal pulses N. Results are summarized in Fig. 6 . The proposed adaptation method indeed increases the SKR compared to the case when a fixed source intensity at ¼ 0:195 is used, which is optimal for the average channel conditions. By perfect predictions, we upper bound the SKR by assuming accurate channel states are perfectly predicted and adjustments of source are in time. As we can see from Fig. 6 , although the substantial technologies challenge of creating on-demand single photon sources continuous to limit the possibility of "pure" BB84 at high data rate that we are considering here, i.e. 1 Gbps, by comparing with the SKR of ideal BB84 using single photon sources, our adaptation method narrows the gap of using commercial sources based on WCP in FSO QKD systems. The improvement ratio in SKR for the perfect compensation case is as shown in Fig. 6 at the bottom. In addition, the performance of adaptation method depends on the accuracy of predictions. As the predication accuracy degrades, when the prediction length increases, the SKR get reduced compared to the ideal perfect prediction case. The SKR corresponding to one coherence time ahead prediction closely approaches the perfect prediction case.
Optimization of Decoy State Protocol and Evaluation of SKRs in the Presence of Strong Atmospheric Turbulence
Decoy state QKD protocol was proposed to solve the security problem of multi-photon emissions. In decoy state protocols, measurable parameters, like detection rate and QBERs, of single-photon QKD scheme can be well estimated by implementing several decoy states and analyzing detected quantities for different states. It significantly improves SKRs. The performance of decoy state protocols depends on several protocol parameters, namely, the number of decoy states, the intensities of decoy states, and the probability of choosing each state.
For optimization of the decoy state protocol, we follow the protocol description given in [13] . A BB84 based decoy state protocol is used with three different states: one signal state and TABLE 2 Average channel condition parameters two decoy states. In [28] , it has been shown that the improvement is less than one percent with respect to SKR for using more than two decoy states apart from signal state. Here, we use ¼ f 1 ; 2 ; 3 g to denote the three states used in the protocol, i.e., ¼ f 1 ; 2 ; 3 g, to denote the corresponding source intensities. Each state will be chosen with probability
Following the security proof technique of decoy state protocol based on the uncertainty relation for smooth entropies [6] , [7] , [11] , the SKR for an unbiased bases decoy state protocol, in which two mutually bases are equally chosen, is given as
where lower bound and upper bound are indicated by underbars and overbars, respectively. In (7), Q ðnÞ denotes the detection rate at Bob's side which is contributed from signals with n photons emitted at Alice's source. With e we denote the total QBER, while e ðnÞ represents the QBER for n-photon signals. Similarly to the BB84 calculation, hðx Þ is the binary Shannon entropy function. The parameter leak EC corresponds to the information that Alive and Bob need to exchange during the error correction, or often called information reconciliation procedure. This part of information must be subtracted when calculating SKR since Eve could know these bits by simply tapping the classic channel. Typically it is given as leak EC % Q Á f EC Á hðeÞ, in which Q is the total detection rate and f EC is the error correction efficiency. The last term ÁðNÞ is related to the security under finite size effect, which is given by
Again, the QKD protocol is called "-secure, or more precisely " cor -correct and " sec -secret with " ¼ " sec þ " cor . The lower bounds and upper bounds in (8) are derived using Hoeffding's inequality [29] and constrained optimization. More specifically, measurable quantities in the protocol, such as detection counts and number of errors, are bounded from the asymptotic values by Hoeffding's inequality: jx asym À x j ðx =2 Á lnð1="ÞÞ 1=2 with a failure probability of 2". Then, these bounds are used as constrained limits to solve optimization problem to estimate quantities which cannot be directly measured. For example, linear programing is used to obtain the detection rate of n-photon signals q i 
where e i ¼ E i =N i is the QBER from each state i , and E i is the total number of errors that get detected in state i .
Numerical optimization has been performed to determine the optimal parameters for the decoy states protocol. Results with total number of exchanged signal pulses N ¼ 10 8 are provided in Fig. 7 . As shown in the figure, source intensity for signal state does not need to be scaled down in linear fashion with the channel transmittance, and the optimal value maintains in a relatively high level of $ 1. As the channel loss increases, a stronger decoy state are needed more often for estimating single photon statistic since the detection rate is low. Note that, our numerical results indicate that one of the decoy states is always optimal at zero intensity, which is consistent with the analysis in [10] in which such a state is called a vacuum decoy state.
Similarly to WCP-based BB84, FSO based decoy state QKD suffers from the scintillation effect. In this case, the optimal protocol parameters will change according to our prediction of channel states. We simulate the decoy state protocol described above under strong turbulence with the proposed adaptation method being employed. The same security coefficients " sec ¼ " cor ¼ 10 À6 and background noise p b ¼ 10 À5 are used as in the WCP-based BB84 protocol. The results are shown in the Fig. 8 . For the fixed parameters case, we use the optimal values based on average channel transmittance which given as signal state intensity 1 ¼ 0:96 with probability p 1 ¼ 97%, decoy state intensity 2 ¼ 0:05 with probability p 2 ¼ 2:5%, and vacuum state intensity 3 ¼ 0 with probability p 3 ¼ 0:5%. As we can see from the Fig. 8 , SKRs are improved with adaptation method and the level of SKR performance improvement is related to the accuracy of predictions. The SKR is upper bounded by the perfect prediction case. Note that, compared with BB84 protocols, since the SKR scales linearly with the channel transmittance for decoy state protocol [31] , the improvement of adapting source intensity is lower. For the fixed parameter case, the optimal parameters are calculated under asymptotic assumption, thus it performs better when the total number of transmitted signal pulses N is large. The adaptation improvement is reduced from 20% at N ¼ 10 6 to 5% at N ¼ 10 9 with respect to SKR for perfect adaptations. One coherence time ahead prediction case closely approaches the perfect channel condition case, and it is helpful for all N values. However, the accuracy of five coherence time ahead predictions is not good enough to improve the SKR at all N's. When N is large, where the fixed parameter case performs well, the adaptation method leads to a lower SKR due to mismatch from poor channel state predictions. In this sense, decoy state protocol requires higher prediction accuracy than the original BB84.
Concluding Remarks and Discussion
In this paper, we analyzed the scintillation effect in time-varying FSO channel on QKD systems together with finite size effect and proposed an adaptation method for improving the secret key rates of FSO based QKD schemes. We first optimized WCP-based QKD protocols, and described a time-varying scintillation channel model under strong turbulence regime suitable for study of QKD over FSO channels. We demonstrated that the proposed adaptation method of adapting source intensity based on channel state information can significantly improve the SKR performance. For WCP-based BB84 protocol, the improvement using adaptation method increases as the total number transmitted signal pulses increases since the effect of scintillation and finite size resources show the opposite trend. Similarly, for decoy state protocol, we showed the improvement of adaptation method. However, due to the inherent property of decoy statebased protocols that the usage of different source intensities prevents turning down the source power too much and given that the SKR scales linearly with the channel transmittance, the adaptation method requires higher accuracy. In practice, the secret key is generally computed or distilled from a relatively small number of signal pulses (typically with N much smaller than 10 6 ). Therefore, for practical applications, the proposed adaptation method provides significant SKR performance improvement for both WCP-based BB84 and decoy state protocols in the presence of strong turbulence in time-varying FSO channels. Apart from the scintillation effect we studied in this paper, there are other effects that would degrade the performance of QKD systems. Source fluctuations can be another important limitation in QKD systems. For the VCSEL sources that we consider in our work, a useful parameter, i.e., relative intensity noise (RIN), is given to indicate the quality of the laser. The RIN definition is given as RIN ¼ 10logðhPðt Þ 2 i=P 2 0 Þ À 10logðÁf Þ, [dB/Hz], which is related to the detection system bandwidth Áf [32] . The typical RIN value of VCSEL lasers working at 1550 nm is −125 dB/Hz. For our study, we assume a 0.1 nm background rejection filter is used at the receiver. We can then easily calculate the ratio of mean square fluctuation and mean square power using the definition of RIN yielding 0.0039, which is much smaller than the fluctuations due to turbulence for our FSO link, so that the source intensity fluctuations can be ignored.
